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POSTSCRIPT 
by Gilbert Ryle 
Professor Kolenda generously offered me the chance of having, in this 
volume of our Proceedings, whatever last words I liked. With two exceptions, 
I am renouncing this privilege. We all had in our viva voce discussions in 
Rice University every opportunity of trying to justify ourselves. If we failed 
then, it would be unfair for just one of us to fire, with impunity, extra parting 
shl:ts now. 
My two exceptions are these: I) Owing to his removal to hospital, Professor 
Kolenda's contribution could not be orally delivered to us, or therefore 
debated by us. So I say in print now what I think I would have said viva 
voce then, had this been possible. I am, in intention, not having the last word, 
but belatedly having merely my allotted second word. 
11) Professor Bouwsma's contribution was a comparison between Ryle and 
Wittgenstein; and this contribution we did discuss viva voce, even with some 
heat. I have no wish to fire, at this stage, any more parting shots on Ryle's 
behalf. But I do want to challenge in print Bouwsma's general survey of the 
Philosophical Investigations, on behalf of the philosopher Wittgenstein hirn- 
self. 
Not many of us philosophers who are alive today are old enough to 
remember the differences made by Wittgenstein to the air that we were 
breathing in the 1920's, the 1930's, or even the 1940's. So if, as is bound to 
happen, our memories and estimates of these differences are not unanimous, 
it is of some historical importance that these discrepancies be recorded. It 
would be worse than a pity if the Philosophical Investigations were to be read 
only through Bouwsma's spectacles-or only through Ryle's. 
Apart from a few trivialities and one quite important matter of emphasis, 
I gladly accept Kolenda's Ryle-survey. In particular I welcome his conspectus 
of Austin, Melden, Louch, Dray, Walsh, Stigen, and Ryle. Kolenda is surely 
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right in finding us all aiming at contiguous, even overlapping targets. Some- 
times, perhaps, we are inadvertently hitting one another's targets. 
There remains the one matter, maybe one only of intellectual biography, 
about which Kolenda seems to me unwittingly to overemphasize one thing 
and to underemphasize another. His title, "The Recovery of the Human," 
plus a few incidental remarks, could give the impression that the Ryle of The 
Concept of Mind was engaged in a task of heroic knight-errantry on behalf 
of the oppressed concept of Man. Dragons had to be killed in order that Merit 
might be saved. 
My trouble is that it did not, at the time, feel at all like that. I did not 
seem to myself to be a dialectical Galahad or Quixote. I did indeed hope 
to disembowel Cartesian duplicationism side by side with Hobbist or Wat- 
sonian reductionism; but this hope derived much less from a chivalrous 
ambition to rescue any conceptual damsel in distress than from an experi- 
mentalist's desire to try out on eligible guinea pigs a new anatomical tech- 
nique. Kolenda underestimates the extent to which would-be philosophers 
of my generation were captivated by metaphilosophical or toolshop questions 
about the proper methods and objectives-if any-of philosophy itself. I say 
"if any," since philosophy's recent severance from Psychology or Mental 
Science, and its recent awakening from the (usually) theological dream of 
Transcendent Ontology or Metaphysics had made plenty of us quite nervous 
about philosophy's pretensions to exist at all. If philosophy was not Science 
or even a science, there seemed nothing else respectable for it to be. Only 
Science is respectable. 
Kolenda's Section I begins: "The search for a correct account of human 
experience has always been accompanied by a parallel or concomitant ques- 
tion: What is philosophy?" As an historical generalization, this seems to me 
not to be true. But anyhow in my own case I am sure that this Iatter question 
was not an offshoot of the former search. On the contrary, at least my study 
of Phenomenology's "account of human experience" was partly motivated 
by a critical interest in Husserl's special-and erroneous-answer to our 
metaphilosophical question. I can concede to Kolenda that I wrote about "the 
systematic elusiveness of 'I"' partly to block one variety of Determinism; but 
I also wanted to show that Russell's esotericisms about selfmembership and 
selfreference had unexpected exoteric applications. My thoughts about the 
contrived paradox of Heterologicality had, I fancy, no Philanthropic attach- 
ments. 
We need to remember nowadays that it was once a huge relief and 
encouragement that we could find, or expect to find, ways of finally disposing 
of such specialist riddles as those of Heterologicality and Tomorrow's Sea- 
Battle. They showed, if only from the periphery, that we philosophers had, 
after all, a me'tier of our very own. To put my main point in another way: 
Kolenda slides rather casually past the Russellian notion of the nonsensical 
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versus the true-or-false; and past Wittgenstein's derivative and diversified 
notion of what is and what is not in breach of 'logical grammar." But for 
some of us these notions not only affected the procedures of our thinking; 
they were also constant and central topics of our thought. I hope that we 
were, quite often, conceptual Philanthropists; but we were also, very often, 
aspiring philosophical technicians. 
Like us, Bouwsma has his own Wittgenstein. 1) He ends by assimilating 
the Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Investigations to the psychoanalyst. Now 
Wittgenstein did at one stage ply this model. But the Investigations, outside 
254-255 and perhaps 133, does not use it. Moreover, for Bouwsma himself 
the Ii?vestigations is a manual of philosophical skills; but abilities to extricate 
oneself from conceptual tangles are acquired sagacities, not convalescences. 
2) The Investigations does indeed coach us in the arts of conceptual disen- 
tanglement. Its accents are occasionally quite governessy, But Bouwsma for- 
gets that behind the mentor there was the philosopher. The knots which 
Wittgenstein shows us how to untie are knots which he himself had first to 
find out how to untie. It is the Notebooks especially that exhibit to us the 
philosopher eagerly or despondently exploring his own flybottles from inside. 
For those undocile souls who respond less emulously to soIicitous shepherd- 
i n g ~  than to live examples of pioneering, Bouwsma should have vouchsafed 
something about Wittgenstein the explorer. Though we hear much of our 
warfare against confusions, no particular pocket of confusion gets pinpointed, 
or the appropriate way of conquering i t  specified. 
We are told with pathos that Wittgenstein "sought to bring relief, control, 
calm, quiet, peace, release, a certain power." Well! -what of the Wittgenstein 
who got us interested, fascinated, excited, angry, shocked? He electrified us. 
Whom did he ever tranquilize? 
3) Like Wittgenstein, Bouwsma shudders at the idea that the philosopher 
has theories. Very well, let us relinquish to the Royal Society this vulgar noun. 
But Bouwsma's primness gets the better of him when he, abetted by Wittgen- 
stein, says of the Philosophical Investigations: ". . . not at all as a theory of 
mind, in fact as no theory at all. . . . It contains no arguments at all. There 
are no proofs. It rectifies nothing. There is nothing to rectify. There are no 
refutations. . . ." Later, he prefers the phrase "the art of discover[ing] and 
dispelling confusion," to the coarser locution "the correction of mistakes." 
No theory of mind? Yet in the book's last paragraph we read "our investiga- 
tion of psychology." No refutations or corrections of mistakes? Yet Wittgen- 
stein often declares that quite definite mistakes had been committed by St. 
Augustine, Russell, and the author of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. 
Nothing to rectify? Yet Bouwsma quotes: "The philosopher's treatment of 
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a question is like the treatment of an illness" (255). No arguments? Not even 
arguments about the privacy of sensations versus the imputed privacy of 
sensation-concepts? No arguments? Yet: "That is to confound the meaning 
of a name with the bearer of the name. When Mr. N. N, dies one says that 
the bearer of the name dies, not that the meaning dies. And it would be 
nonsensical to say that, for (denn) if the name ceased to have meaning it would 
make no sense to say Mr. N. N. is dead" (40). 
No arguments? Yet: "You say the point isn't the word, but its meaning, 
and you think of the meaning as a thing (Sache) of the same kind as the 
word, though also different from the word. Here the word, there the meaning 
(Bedeutung). The money and the cow that you can buy with it. (But contrast, 
the money and its use.)" (120). 
No arguments? Yet: "I remember having meant (gemeint) him. Am I 
remembering a process or state? - When did it begin, what was its course, 
etc.?" (661). 
No arguments? But lots of Wittgenstein's wearisome interrogatives are, like 
this last one, the rhetorically barbed conclusions of reductio ad absurdum 
arguments. 
The clang of Wittgenstein's metal against the metals of Frege, Russell, 
Ramsey, Brouwer, Moore, and the author of the Tractatus is here muted to 
a soothing bedside murmur. 
